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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 930090-CA

v.
Category No, 2

MARK G. MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992); unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 5837a-5(l) (1990); and two traffic code offenses; driving under the
influence and failure to use headlight

both class B

misdemeanors.
This Court has jurisdiction re hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court permissibly rule that the

officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant?
A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion
existed for an investigative detention will not be overturned
unless clearly erroneous.

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183

(Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App.
1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

But see State v.

Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential,
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992) .
2.

Did the trial court permissibly rule that defendant

had abandoned any privacy interest in his urine, which he left
unflushed in the jail's urinal?
The question of abandonment "is primarily a factual
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken,
acts done, and other objective facts.'"

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d

730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah
1992).

Accordingly, as with other questions of fact, this Court

reviews the trial court's findings under a clearly erroneous
standard.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Utah

R. Civ. P. 52(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991); unlawful possession of
2

drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §
58-37a-5(l) (1990); and two traffic code offenses: driving under
the influence and failure to use headlights, both class B
misdemeanors (R. 1-2).
Defendant filed motions to suppress physical evidence
allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Utah
Code Ann § 77-7-15 (1990), which the trial court denied (R. 4972, 91-93).

He then entered, and the trial court accepted,

conditional guilty pleas to all charges, preserving the right to
appeal the denials of his motions to suppress (R. 133-40).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court did not make detailed findings of fact
in denying defendant's motions to suppress.

See Memorandum

Decision (R. 91-93) (copy contained in an addendum attached to
this brief).

However, it is reasonable to assume that all of the

following facts were found by the court.

See State v. Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991).
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on February 1, 1991, a
Logan City police officer, who was working a special alcohol
assignment, observed a Jeep Cherokee parked on the side of the
street near a drinking establishment.

The officer could see a

driver and passenger in the vehicle.

The Jeep's headlights were

not on.

The officer pulled his unmarked car into a nearby

parking lot and parked where he could see the Jeep.

His purpose

was determine whether someone in the Jeep was drinking alcohol

3

(PH. 6-7, 34) 1 .
A couple of minutes after parking his car, the officer
heard the Jeep's engine start. Without its lights on, the Jeep
then pulled a car length or two forward, made a U-turn, and
proceeded down the street. Approximately ten seconds later, the
Jeep made a full stop at a stop sign, where the vehicle's lights
came on.

It then drove through the intersection and pulled to

the curb.

The driver got out and walked around the vehicle to

the passenger side where another individual had just exited.

The

passenger replaced the driver, and the Jeep drove away (PH. 8-9).
After following the Jeep for a short distance, the
officer stopped it based on the suspicious change of drivers,
which came after the Jeep had made a U-turn and driven a distance
without its lights on.

The officer approached the driver and

asked to speak to the passenger, who was defendant.

When the

officer asked defendant why he and the current driver had traded
places, defendant responded, "I've had too much to drink, so I
didn't want to drive."

Field sobriety tests of defendant led to

his arrest for driving under the influence (PH. 9-13, 38-39).
When defendant was booked into jail, the officers
removed from his person a small amount of cocaine and two rolled
bills (one $50 and one $5), both of which had cocaine on them.
Although defendant submitted to a breath test, he refused urine
and blood tests.

Defendant was placed in a holding room in view

1

The court and the parties relied on the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing to provide the factual basis
for decision on defendant's motions to suppress (Transcr. of
Hearing 4/14/92, at 11-21). References to "PH" are to the
transcript of the preliminary hearing held August 27, 1991.
-4-

of the arresting officer.
but did not flush it.

There, defendant urinated in a urinal

Noticing that defendant had not flushed

the toilet and was now in another part of the room, the officer
had the jailer remove defendant from that room.

The officer then

obtained a urine sample from the basin of the urinal, without
defendant's knowledge or consent.

No one else was in the holding

room and no one but defendant had used the urinal.

The state

crime lab found traces of cocaine and marijuana in the urine
sample (PH. 17-24, 49, 60, 62).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously determined
that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was legal, claiming
that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and was pretextual.

Both claims fail.

The trial court found that the detaining officer had at
least reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation (improper Uturn and failure to use headlights) when he stopped defendant's
vehicle, and therefore the stop was legal.

Defendant does not

challenge this finding, arguing instead that the officer actually
stopped defendant to investigate a possible DUI, for which there
allegedly was no reasonable suspicion, and thus the stop was
unconstitutional.
Defendant misinterprets Fourth Amendment law.

Even if

the officer had only an insufficient "hunch" that defendant had
driven the car while under the influence of alcohol, the stop was
nevertheless a legal stop for the U-turn and no-lights
violations.

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that

-5-

whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is determined
through an objective assessment of the circumstances confronting
the officer; the officer's subjective mental state is irrelevant.
Therefore, it did not matter that the officer may have had
insufficient facts to form a reasonable suspicion of DUI; he
clearly had at least reasonable suspicion to stop for the other
traffic violations.
Defendant's pretext argument similarly misunderstands
the pretext stop doctrine.

The inquiry in pretext analysis is

whether an otherwise legal stop is nevertheless unconstitutional
because a reasonable officer would not have made the stop under
the circumstances.

The test is an objective one, which

disregards the officer's subjective mental state and turns on an
assessment of usual police practice.

Defendant failed to point

to anything below that suggested a reasonable officer would not
normally have stopped a vehicle for improper U-turn or failure to
use headlights, and he likewise fails to do so on appeal.
Accordingly, the Court should summarily reject defendant's
pretext claim.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress a sample of his urine the police
obtained from a jailhouse urinal. He claims he had a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in his urine and the
urinal, and thus the police needed a warrant to seize the urine.
The basic problem with defendant's argument is that he
does not challenge the basis upon which the trial court denied
his motion to suppress the urine sample —

-6-

i.e., abandonment.

The trial court found that defendant had abandoned whatever
privacy interest he had in his urine when he did not flush the
urinal and walked away from it to another part of the room.

Left

unchallenged, the trial court's finding of abandonment disposes
of the Fourth Amendment issue.

Therefore, defendant's attack on

the court's ruling necessarily fails.
Finally, because defendant provides no legal analysis
to support his claim that the trial court should have excluded
the urine sample based on a faulty chain of evidence, the Court
should not consider it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING OF REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
SUPPORT THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously determined
that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was legal. He
claims the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and therefore violated Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1990).

That statute is merely a codification of the Fourth

Amendment standard for an investigatory stop enunciated in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,

541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah
App. 1989).
A.

Standard of Review

A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion
existed for an investigative detention is a finding of fact
subject to the deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review.
-7-

State v, Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v.
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App- 1991), cert, denied, 843
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah
App. 1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990);
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah App. 1988).

See also

State v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42-43 (Utah App. 1993)
(Bench, J., concurring, joined by Jackson, J.) (arguing that
Mendoza's standard of review has not been altered by State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)).

But see State v. Munsen,

821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential,
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992).

Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless

they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or the
appellate court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the
trial court was mistaken.

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah

App. 1990).
B.

Reasonable Suspicion Standard

There is reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to an officer and
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.

Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d at 667.
See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992).
"This suspicion must be 'based upon articulated "objective facts"
then apparent to the officer.'"

Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (quoting

Sandy Citv v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989)).

-8-

Reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence."
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

United States v.

The level of suspicion required

for an investigative stop "is obviously less demanding than that
for probable cause."

Ibid.

In evaluating the validity of such a

stop, a court must consider "'the totality of the circumstances
—

the whole picture.'"

IcL. at 8 (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
257.

See also Roth, 827 P.2d at

As Sokolow notes:
"The process does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common-sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders
are permitted to do the same — and so are
law enforcement officers."

Ibid, (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).
Furthermore, that the behavior may be as consistent
with innocent conduct as criminal does not defeat a finding of
reasonable suspicion.

As the Supreme Court said in Sokolow:

"'[T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly
lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.'

Indeed, Terry itself involved 'a series of acts,

each of them perhaps innocent' if viewed separately, 'but which
taken together warranted further investigation.'"

490 U.S. at 9-

10 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per
curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
C.

The Instant Case

Here, the trial court found that there was reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for an improper U-turn and
-9-

operating a motor vehicle after dark without lights. Memorandum
Decision at 1-3 (R. 91-93).

The court accepted the prosecution's

argument that the officer had at least reasonable suspicion of a
violation of Utah's U-turn law (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-67 (1988))
and vehicle lighting laws (Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-117 through 122
(1988)).

See State's Response at 3 (R. 76).
Defendant does not argue that the officer lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep for these observed traffic
violations, commenting only that "the failure to use headlights
for approximately ten (10) seconds . . . may not constitute a
traffic offense under the circumstances."
(emphasis added).

Br. of Appellant at 16

Rather, he asserts the officer did not have

any basis to stop for driving under the influence and that
detention for the minor traffic offenses was pretextual.
Therefore, he claims, the stop of the Jeep was unconstitutional.
Defendant's argument should be summarily rejected.
Even if the officer had only an insufficient "hunch" that
defendant had driven the Jeep while under the influence of
alcohol when he made the stop, such did not undermine the
legality of the stop for the U-turn and no-lights violations.

It

is well settled that "[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the
time the challenged action was taken."

Maryland v. Macon, 472

U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (citations omitted).
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).

-10-

Accord Scott v.

The other traffic

violations, committed in the officer's presence, gave him a
legally sufficient basis to stop the Jeep; his subjective mental
state was irrelevant.
Defendant's pretext argument, which again focuses on
the officer's alleged subjective intent concerning a possible
DUI, fares no better.

This Court applies the following standard

for determining whether a pretext stop has occurred:

" [I]f a

hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited offense, and the surrounding circumstances
indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional."
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on
other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990).
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer
could

have made a stop.

Id. at 978; State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d

1040, 1046 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
The test is an objective one, which looks to usual police
practice to determine whether the reasonable officer would have
made the stop.
1048-49.

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Lopez, 831 P.2d at

"[T]he officer's subjective motivation is not the

relevant inquiry."

Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (citing Sierra, 754

P.2d at 977).2
2

The Lopez majority opinion is not altogether clear on the
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the pretext
inquiry. For example, it consistently defines the pretext
standard as the "objective question of whether a reasonable
officer would have made the stop under the same circumstances

absent

the illegal

[or unconstitutional]

motivation."

Lopez, 831

P.2d at 1047 (second emphasis added). This statement arguably
leaves the door open to consideration of the officer's subjective
intent. However, in light of the majority's repeated
-11-

Defendant makes no effort to show that the reasonable
officer would not normally stop for the traffic violations that
occurred here.

In fact, he did not do this below.

As this Court

made clear in Lopez, once the State has established that a
traffic violation occurred in the officer's presence or that the
officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a
traffic violation had occurred, the defendant who alleges pretext
must point to some evidence that the stop was not consistent with
usual police practice.

Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1049.

In the absence

of any such evidence, the pretext argument necessarily fails.
See State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 282 (Utah App. 1992)
(Orme, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in
part, joined by Billings, J.) (lack of any evidence offered by
defendant to counter the objectively reasonable conduct of
officer defeated defendant's pretext claim).

Accordingly, the

Court should reject defendant's pretext argument.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT HAD ABANDONED
ANY PRIVACY INTEREST IN HIS URINE AND THAT
THE POLICE SEIZURE OF THE URINE THEREFORE DID
NOT IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In the trial court, defendant challenged the
admissibility of the urine sample obtained by the police from the

admonishments that the officer's subjective intent is not
relevant, e.g., ibid, ("a focus on an individual officer's
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext
would violate the United State Supreme Court's ruling that the
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police
activity"), the State's discussion of pretext doctrine assumes
this Court intends that an officer's subjective intent be
irrelevant.
-12-

urinal on the ground that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the urinal.

This, he claims, required the police to

obtain a warrant before seizing his urine from the urinal.
Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Specimen Result (R. 49-58).

The State

argued that the urine sample was obtained only after defendant
had abandoned his urine and any Fourth Amendment privacy interest
he had therein.

State's Resp. Mem. at 4-5 (R. 77-78).

The court

adopted the State's argument and denied defendant's motion to
suppress the urine sample. Memorandum Decision at 2 (R. 92)
("The Defendant has moved this Court to suppress the specimen
result [sic] taken as an invasion of the Defendant's privacy.
For reasons set forth in the State's response thereto that Motion
is denied.").
A.

Abandonment

The question of abandonment "is primarily a factual
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken,
acts done, and other objective facts.'"

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d

730, 736 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds,
850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992).

Accordingly, as with other questions

of fact, this Court reviews the trial court's findings under a
clearly erroneous standard.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193

(Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
While "the burden of proving abandonment falls on the
state, and must be shown by 'clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence,'" Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736, defendant makes no effort on
appeal to demonstrate that the trial court's finding of
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abandonment was clearly erroneous.
even discuss the abandonment issue.

Indeed, defendant does not
Because the burden of

showing error is on the party who seeks to upset the trial
court's judgment, State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah
1982), this Court could affirm the abandonment finding on the
sole basis that defendant has failed to challenge it on appeal.
See State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228 (Utah App. 1992) (declining
to consider a Fourth Amendment issue raised by the defendant
because he did not challenge the trial court's dispositive "no
standing" ruling).
Even if this Court were to address independently the
abandonment issue, the trial court's ruling is consistent with
cases from other jurisdictions that have considered similar
facts.

For example, in Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. App.

1976), aff'd, 367 A.2d 949 (Md.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 932
(1977), the court held that a criminal defendant did not have a
constitutionally protected right of privacy in his excrement
deposited in a bedpan while he was a hospital patient.

The

police obtained the excrement, which contained a number of
balloons of hashish oil, after nurses had in the course of normal
routine removed the bedpan from the defendant's room.

Noting the

general principle that one does not retain a Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in items once owned, possessed, or controlled if
the items are abandoned, 354 A.2d at 493, the court observed:
It could not be said that a person has no
property right in wastes or other materials
which were once a part of or contained within
his body, but which normally are discarded
after their separation from the body. It is
not unknown for a person to assert a
-14-

continuing right of ownership, dominion, or
control, for good reason or no reason, over
such things as excrement, fluid waste,
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails,
blood, and organs or other parts of the body,
whether their separation from the body is
intentional, accidental, or merely the result
of normal body functions•
But it is all but universal human custom
and human experience that such things are
discarded — in a legal sense, abandoned —
by the person from whom they emanate, either
"on the spot", or, if social delicacy
requires it, at a place or in a manner
designed to cause the least offense to
others.
Id. at 498-99.
Based on the foregoing, the court then held that the
defendant, who did nothing and said nothing to indicate an intent
to assert his right of ownership, possession, or control over his
feces or the balloons contained therein, had abandoned them.
at 499.

Id.

Therefore, defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy

interest in his excrement, and such was lawfully retrieved by the
police.

Ibid.
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v.

Woods, 3 M.J. 645 (NCMR 1977), which held that examination by
authorities of excrement emitted by the accused while he was in
detention during an investigation of illegal possession of heroin
did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, because the excrement had been abandoned by the
accused.

Id. at 646-48.
The reasoning of Venner and Woods applies here.

Whatever Fourth Amendment privacy interest defendant had in the
urine he deposited in the jailhouse urinal was abandoned when he
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did not flush the urinal and walked away from it.

In short,

assuming defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
urine when he first deposited it in the urinal, his actions
manifested a voluntary relinquishment of that privacy interest.
See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736.
B.

Chain of Evidence

Defendant's additional "chain of evidence" challenge to
the admissibility of the urine sample is defective.

The trial

court conditionally rejected this challenge, leaving open to
defendant the opportunity to produce authority contrary to the
court's position (Transcr. of Hearing 11/17/92, at 57).

However,

there is no indication in the record or defendant's appellate
brief that he ever presented contrary authority to the court.
More importantly, defendant fails to provide any
analysis of the issue in his appellate brief, content simply to
state, without elaboration, that "admitting such evidence is . .
. violative . . . of defendant's trial right to be free from
highly prejudicial evidence being received when the source of
such evidence is insufficiently linked to the defendant."
Appellee at 20.

Br. of

It is well settled that an appellate court

generally will not address arguments not supported by legal
analysis.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)

("Since the defendant fails to support [her] argument by any
legal analysis, we decline to rule on it."); State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (approving principle that appealing
party may not "dump the burden of argument and research" in the
appellate court); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
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1992) (declining to address inadequate appellate argument under
rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and citing
supporting precedent).
Accordingly, this Court should not consider defendant's
"chain of evidence" argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motions to
suppress and affirm his conviction.
AJL
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 911000087

MARK G. MILLER,
Defendant

THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
to Quash the Bindover. Cited for authority by the Defendant is
State vs. Humphrey, 176 Advanced Reports (Dec. 18, 1991). This
Court has earlier ruled on the issue with respect to whether
State vs. Humphrey requires a full review of the transcript of
the Preliminary Hearing. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed
the entire transcript. With respect to the issues raised in
State vs. Humphrey, specifically that of jurisdiction, the
Court finds that it does have jurisdiction in this case.
Specifically with respect to the corpus delicti argument raised
by the defense and for the reasons set forth in the State's
Response, the Motion is denied. Evidence was produced that the
Defendant was stopped as a result of illegal conduct (operating
a vehicle after dark, u-turn, no lights) and when further
inquiry was made, by the officer, as to behavior by the
Defendant, he volunteered that he had too much to drink to be
able to drive. That simply lead to further investigation by
the officer.
Whether that statement is specifically necessary in order
to establish corpus delicti depends upon the availability or
lack of other facts. The officer did have facts available to
him, by observation, that someone was operating the vehicle and
that
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someone left the vehicle and went around to the passenger
side. Whether that specific person was the Defendant or the
person in the back seat that had been operating the vehicle was
cleared up by an admission by the Defendant that he in fact had
been drinking to much and therefore did not want to drive.
Thereafter field sobriety and breath tests were administered.
Defendant can still raise the defense that in fact it was not
he who was driving, but was the passenger found in the rear of
the vehicle.
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient
without the admission by the Defendant, and for preliminary
hearing purposes that he was the driver in order for the State
to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. For purposes of
affirming the finding of the magistrate and the bindover order.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The Defendant has moved this Court to suppress the specimen
result taken as an invasion of the Defendant's privacy. For
reasons set forth in the State's Response thereto that Motion
is denied.
MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUPPRESS
This matter is likewise before the Court upon a Motion to
Dismiss or Suppress for the reason that the Defendant was
stopped without probable cause and in violation of Section
77-7-15 of the Utah Code and in addition thereto that the stop
was a pretext stop.
The Court has already addressed the issue with respect to
the violation of the traffic laws observed by the officer and

State vs. Miller
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its causal sufficiently to stop the vehicle in which the
Defendant was riding to either issue a citation or further
investigate. Upon further investigation it was determined that
intoxication was a factor. In addition, the officer had some
suspicion that there may be something more wrong with the
Defendant's driving than simply making an improper u-turn with
out lights.
The question is whether the officer is permitted by law,
given the totality of the circumstances to make the stop. This
Court would find that in fact the officer articulated a
reasonable cause to stop the vehicle and pursuant thereto
inquired of the driver as to the behavior. His response could
have been a number of things, such as he simply forgot to turn
the lights on or otherwise, but his response was, HI have had
to much to drinkM. The initial stop was justified. In the
Defendant giving the statement
and
all
of
the other
circumstances involved, the Court finds that the stop was
justified as was the further investigation and therefore the
Motion is denied.
Counsel for the State is directed to prepare a formal Order
in conformance herewith.

